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Transcendental Pragmatics and Hermeneutics.1  
Validity and critique. What is a critical social science? 
 
Abstract:  
In which sense could transcendental pragmatics combined with a hermeneutical approach provide 
the social sciences with a critical oriented approach? This essay aims at giving an answer to that 
question by elaborating the critical intent of Apel’s approach to transcendental pragmatics and 
hermeneutics. Hermeneutics itself is considered to have critical potentials by its explicit focus 
upon the normative presuppositions of the social sciences. Hermeneutics does not, however, 
provide the sciences with any clear-cut criterions of critique. Nor does hermeneutics escape from 
a certain relativistic strain, due to the contextual, i.e.; socio-historically relative basis of the 
normative presuppositions of any hermeneutic approach. The meta-normative conditions of 
transcendental pragmatics are counterpoising the relativism as well as lack of normative 
criterions inherent in hermeneutical thinking. The meta-normative conditions of symmetry and 
reciprocity are meant to be a meta-normative standard for critique as well as functioning as 
conditions of a valid consensus within a community of scientists. Thereby, Apel is giving a 
solution to the validation-problem, as well as a compensation for the lack of criterions of 
criticism within hermeneutics. I will divide the essay into three main topics, and i) start with 
explicating the transcendental-pragmatic approach of Apel, ii) continue by dealing with his 
criticism of as well as positive appropriation of hermeneutical thinking, and iii) work out 
examples of a critical-hermeneutical approach in the last parts of the essay. The main example 
used will be from contemporary Norwegian sociology, dealing with the possibility of a unitary 
critical approach to the phenomenon of neo-Nazism. The closing part (iv) will have clarifying 
purposes. 
 
 
I The transcendental-pragmatic approach. 
1.0 The critical intent of Apel: 
Apel’s main concern for many years has been to clarify the normative conditions of a critical 
social science. The discursive conditions of symmetry and reciprocity2 are given a twofold 
function within Apel’s thinking. On the one hand, they are regarded as the basic preconditions for 
reaching a valid consensus within the sciences. As such, they function as basic validity-
conditions. On the other hand, they are also carriers of an intrinsic normative content that turns 
the conditions of symmetry and reciprocity into meta-norms of understanding- and consensus-
oriented communication (Apel (1988): 99). "The ideal community of communication" is the key 
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 This is an extended and improved version of a paper published in Parabel in 2004: cf. Hedberg, Petra (2004): 
”Transcendental Pragmatics and Hermeneutics.”, Trondheim, Norway: Tapir Forlag, Parabel, Vol. VII, 1/2004, pp. 
35-61.The subtitle has been changed in this version, although the main title remains unaltered. 
2
 Here, I am making use of the Habermasian formula of "symmetry and reciprocity", cf. (Habermas (1990): 88). Apel 
is not adhering to these abstractive terms himself, but speaks about the "equal right to take part" and the "co-
responsibility of the members of a discourse.", cf. (Apel (1999): 48). 
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term in this respect. By clarifying the conditions of reaching a valid understanding and 
consensus, Apel is explicating the counter-factual conditions that must be vindicated within any 
real community of communication, if a valid consensus is to come through. 
 At the ideal level, these conditions can be formulated in a unitary way. Like Habermas, 
Apel maintains that reciprocity and symmetry, like the four validity-claims of the discourse, refer 
to the argumentative traits of language use. The four validity-claims presuppose that any 
understanding oriented communication, i.e.; communication oriented towards mutual 
understanding, implies the truth- and rightness-orientedness as well as the sincerity of each 
participant. Symmetry and reciprocity imply the equal opportunity of each participant to take part 
in the discourse. Symmetry and reciprocity also represent conditions conceived in purely 
argumentative terms. By taking the arguments of one another into consideration on an equal 
basis, the participants fulfil the requirements of symmetry and reciprocity. 
These twofold argumentative conditions are of special importance in practical discourses, 
since practical discourses also must include the interests of the participants, in addition to 
securing the mutuality and inclusiveness of argumentation. In practical discourses, the principle 
of universalisation ("U") is needed, in order to take care of this additional condition of "each 
person's particular interests". 3 As formulated by Habermas (and Apel): (U) For a norm to be 
valid, the consequences and side effects of its general observance for the satisfaction of each 
person’s particular interests must be acceptable to all. (cf. (Habermas (1990): 197)4 as well as 
(Apel (1999): 49)).   
 Owed to the many obstacles that might be at hand in “real discourses”, the issue of 
symmetry and reciprocity is less clear-cut at the real than the ideal level.  In real discourses, the 
positions of the participants themselves, as well as the possible economic and administrative 
interests linked to these positions, may serve as obstacles to a communication on equal basis. The 
interests linked to the positions may be hidden from the other participants, thereby letting an 
allegedly understanding-oriented communication conceal the success-orientedness inherent in 
strategic forms of communication. The positions of some of the participants might be 
authoritative in the eyes of other participants, thereby linking the strength of the better argument 
to the strength of the higher position. The main aim of critique will be, therefore, to point at 
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 The original version of this essay, cf. (Hedberg (2004)), did not take this difference between practical and 
theoretical discourses into consideration. These remarks are therefore added to this extended version. 
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 This paper was added to the English translation of Moralbewuβtsein und kommunikatives Handeln. (Frankfurt a. 
M.: Suhrkamp 1983). The paper itself was, however, not published until 1986, in: Kuhlmann, Wolfgang (ed.): 
Moralität und Sittlichkeit. Das Problem Hegels und die Diskursethik. (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1986). 
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possible obstacles inherent in real communities of communication: obstacles to the realization of 
the ideal argumentative conditions of symmetry and reciprocity.  
 Apel maintains that there is a sharp difference between the ideal level and the real level of 
communication, i.e., between the “ideal community of communication” and the (manifold) “real 
community (communities) of communication”.  In one of his programmatic formulations, he 
claims that one could never expect a full-scale conformity with the ideal conditions at the real 
level. The real communities of communication will only approximately, and to different degrees, 
be able to conform to the conditions of the ideal community of communication. He, therefore, 
points out that “the ideal community of communication” must be conceived as a regulative idea 
(Apel (1988): 100-101). 
 This principal difference is due to another principal difference: the difference between 
justification and application. Justification, i.e.; the ultimate kind of justification,5 is conducted on 
a purely reflexive basis. Reflexively, the conditions are to be demonstrated as unavoidable within 
any understanding-oriented argumentation, by showing that the violation of any of the conditions 
and claims will lead to a defective (non-valid) agreement. An agreement based on coercion would 
be the clearest example of a non-valid agreement between persons. Coercive speech acts are, 
however, not always easy to identify within the real communities of communication. Strategic 
speech acts of the covert kind may, in fact, be difficult to identify. Any participant might feel 
compelled to agree with a more authoritative person, given that the more authoritative person 
may use his/her authority in order to pursue sanctions towards the less authoritative one. This 
agreement might as well be due to a one-sided respect, whereby the less authoritative person feels 
compelled to agree on a, reasonable enough, basis, given that the more authoritative person 
represents a person with more knowledge or skill. This kind of agreement may easily be 
concealed as an agreement based upon a symmetrical and reciprocal understanding of the subject 
matter discussed. The lacking validity of this non-coercive variety of agreement will be due to the 
fact that, here, strategic communication is concealed as understanding-oriented communication, 
based upon an asymmetric relationship between the participants.  
The discursive conditions are clear-cut enough at the ideal level: symmetry is conceived 
as the equal opportunity to take part in a discourse, implying equal weight given to the arguments 
of the different participants. At the real level, real asymmetries and non-reciprocities may serve 
as obstacles to the ideal conditions of a symmetry and reciprocity of argumentation. These 
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 Here, I see the need to distinguish between justification in the weaker sense and justification in the strongest sense 
of the word, i.e.; ultimate justification. Specific normative as well as factual claims may always be justified in a 
weaker sense, by not expecting the reasons given to be finally certified. The original version of this essay did not 
take this difference into consideration, so these remarks are added to this extended version. 
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asymmetries may be identified, but not verified in any final sense. The justificatory certainty at 
the ideal level is counterpoised with a fallibilism at the real level. A community of researchers 
may be conceived as a community approximating the ideal conditions in the highest available 
degree, but this community is also a real community of communication, not an ideal one. A valid 
consensus may, therefore, be distorted by strategic communication within this community as 
well. The community might, or might not, fulfil the conditions to the highest possible degree, but 
the fulfilment can never be stated for sure, simply because of the self-referential status of the 
conditions within the real community. The community would, after all, have to (discursively to) 
agree on the point that the (discursive) conditions were fulfilled at a given time of the discourse. 
This agreement would, also, depend on the conditions of a valid consensus. A fallibilism is 
therefore also due to the fact that the conditions may not have been fulfilled in the first place.  
Additionally, fallibilism is due to the fact that even within alleged symmetrical and 
reciprocal relationships, disagreements might arise. Reasonable disagreements might be due to 
the subject matter itself. Especially when normative questions are treated, rival answers could be 
given. At the real level, “symmetry” might be conceived in socio-economic terms, in order to 
identify the possible obstacles to the realization of the ideal conditions. Interpreted socio-
economically, symmetry and reciprocity could be interpreted in terms of economic equality. 
Disagreements would probably arise, if different members of a community of researchers try to 
define the term equality. At least two different rival versions could be at hand: equality defined in 
terms of “equal rights” opposed to “distributive principles of justice”. 
 
A short summary: 
Fallibilism at the real level of communication is due to the: 
- Self-referential status of the discursive conditions. 
- The possibility of concealing strategic actions and communication by, allegedly, 
understanding-oriented means. 
- The subject matter itself, i.e.; the normative and factual claims that can not be justified in 
any final sense. 
 
 The principal difference between the ideal and real level does, therefore, also concern the 
difference between justification and application. At a justificatory level, the ideal conditions are 
to be formulated in a unitary way. At the real level, the application of the conditions will be apt to 
tentative and fallible interpretations. The real level is entangled with a principal problem of 
validation and the pluralism of interpretations that might arise out of this fallibilism. The 
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challenging questions will therefore be: 1) to which extent may hermeneutics serve as a useful 
device for clarifying the normative content of different perspectives? 2) In which sense could 
transcendental pragmatics serve as a critical device, clarifying the symmetry and-reciprocity-
potentials in given normative perspectives? 3) In which sense do the ideal conditions of the 
transcendental-pragmatic approach serve as validation-ground as well as meta-normative ground 
for a critically transformed hermeneutics? 
 I will start by giving a short historical background-account of the relationship between 
hermeneutics and transcendental pragmatics. Hermeneutics was, after all, criticized for not being 
“critical enough”, because of the hermeneutical ignorance of the empirical part of the social 
sciences. The empirical part of the social sciences is taken care of in Apel’s transcendental-
pragmatic transformation of hermeneutics, by linking the practical discourse to the theoretical 
discourse. Before turning to the transcendental-pragmatic transformation of hermeneutics, I will 
deal with the critique of the lack of criterions of criticism within hermeneutical thinking. 
 
II The hermeneutical approach 
2.1 Hermeneutics and critique 
One of the main critiques of Gadamer’s hermeneutics was carried out by Habermas in the 60-ies. 
In his review of Gadamer’s Wahrheit und Methode (Habermas (1988): chap. 8), Habermas 
focused at the strengths as well as weaknesses of the hermeneutic position. On the one hand, 
hermeneutics was supposed to serve as a useful corrective to the explanatory and nomological 
scientific methodology. Social science does rely on theoretical accounts of the historical changes 
from tradition to modernity. These are theoretical perspectives which, as such, can not become 
subject to empirical testing. The hermeneutic method of understanding would therefore be of 
relevance for the theoretical level of science, as a complementary to empirical and explanatory 
methodology. Habermas’s main concern was Gadamer’s failure to take the explanatory part of 
science into consideration. By not taking the explanatory part into consideration, Gadamer 
abolished the critical intent of social science. According to Habermas, a hermeneutic concept of 
tradition would be enclosed within the self-understanding of tradition, and not be able to confront 
the tradition with critical questions. Traditional world-views were considered to serve as a 
defence of a given social order, and did therefore not carry any critical potential. The explanatory 
part of science could, therefore, serve as corrective to given world-views, by pointing to relations 
of economy and power not revealed, but rather defended, by the tradition.  
 Given the subsequent development of Habermas’s formal-pragmatic perspective as well 
as Apel’s transcendental pragmatics, one may retrospectively ask whether an explanatory science 
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itself may serve as a source of criterions of critique. One may even confront this conception of 
science with a fundamental, Gadamerian question: would not the critical potential of social 
science depend on the questions asked, rather than the material presented? De facto inequalities 
presented in social statistics would not present themselves as inequalities if not being defined as 
inequalities by the scientists in the first place. Certain normative laden questions would have to 
be asked in advance, if the material itself were to reveal inequalities made notice of, such as:  
“Are these inequalities acceptable? Do they point to differences that make a difference? May, for 
instance, low-income levels restrict the capacity to take part in the democratic processes of the 
society? Or do existing differences rather point to acceptable differences, in terms of “to each 
according to his merits”?”6 
 Habermas did not only criticize hermeneutics because of its lacking acknowledgement of 
the empirical source of social scientific knowledge. He also criticized hermeneutics because of its 
devaluation of reflection7, implying that critical thinking could not be conducted within the 
framework of tradition. Hermeneutics does, therefore, lack the potential for critical thinking not 
only because of its ignorance of empirical research, but also because of its failure to recognize the 
critical potential of reflection: 
 
It requires a system of reflection that transcends the context of tradition as such. 
Only then can tradition be criticized as well. But how is such system of reference to 
be legitimated in turn except through the appropriation of tradition?  
(Habermas (1988): 170). 
 
Using Gadamer against Habermas, one may claim that the “priority of the question” (Gadamer 
(1996): 362-391) within hermeneutical thinking could serve as a source of criticism, provided 
that the tradition contains “critical” prejudices as well. Criticism does not arise from the “brute 
data” themselves, but rather from the critical interpretation of data8. Within the later position of 
Habermas, the relationship between “facts” and “norms” is dealt with in a more thorough fashion. 
                                                 
6
 See, for instance, the different principles of distributive justice discussed by Habermas in: ”Morality, Society and 
Ethics: An Interview with Torben Hviid Nielsen.”, in (Habermas (1995): 152). This interview was originally 
published in: Acta Sociologica 33 (1990).  (Habermas (1995)) is, in fact, a partial translation of Erläuterungen zur 
Diskursethik. (1991), containing the last three chapters of the German work.   
7
 In the Merciers Lectures of 1999, Apel presents a similar criticism of the hermeneutical thinking of Gadamer: the 
contextual presuppositions of hermeneutics make it impossible to establish a reflective distance to the given 
historical and social surroundings. Hermeneutics, therefore, relapses into historicism and relativism. The criticism of 
hermeneutics of the late 60-ies and the 70-ies has, hence, not lost its relevance; cf. esp. (Apel (1999): 65-77).  
8
 One of the few remarks Gadamer made about statistics, is to be found in: “The Universality of the Hermeneutical 
Problem”, in (David E. Linge (ed.) (1976): 11). 
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The discourse theory explicates the common, argumentative ground of empirical as well as 
normative questions.  
 One of the differences between the Habermasian and Apelian positions consists in their 
different approaches to the relationship between the practical and theoretical discourse. Habermas 
makes a sharp distinction between the two types of discourses, by emphasizing the principal 
differences between fact and norms. Norms are uncoupled from the cultural background when 
treated by practical discourses. Their main validation ground is based on the agreement between 
participants affected by the norms; meaning agreement between participants of a practical 
discourse. Problematic normative questions form the main focus of the practical discourse. The 
theoretical discourse, on the other hand, is the exclusively scientific discourse treating empirical 
questions at a descriptive and explanatory level. This form of discourse depends on a material 
“given” in quite another sense than the practical. Questions of truth depend on a correspondence-
based criterion of truth in addition to the consensus-based. In Moral Consciousness and 
Communicative Action, Habermas makes a sharp distinction between the inductive bridging-
principle of theoretical discourses, and the consensual bridging-principle of the practical ones 
(Habermas (1990): 63-4).9  
The ambiguity rising out of this distinction consists in the fact that the scientific 
discourses of the social sciences must treat normative questions as well as descriptive. A 
distinction between facts and norms seems reasonable at the analytic level, but in scientific 
discourses within the human and social sciences, the distinction between fact and norms is not 
clear-cut when put into practice. The reconstructive historical level of the social sciences will 
work as a useful example in this respect. Historical reconstructions will aim at a descriptive 
approach by describing a certain development of norms and values over time, without taking into 
the consideration that the norms “described” may be a part of an evaluative interpretation 
conducted by the researchers themselves. The Durkheimian concept of anomie serves as an 
exemplary case in this respect. After all, anomie could not be used in pure descriptive terms: it 
contains negative connotations and works as a key-term in an evaluation of a given historical 
development. Contrasted with a more optimistic account of the modernisation process (for 
instance Habermas’s own account), Durkheim certainly gave a pessimistic account of the 
modernisation as such. Given that anomie is considered to be the central term in a sociological 
interpretation of Durkheim’s thinking, then the evaluative content of this interpretation could be 
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 For a more recent approach to the question of facts versus norms, see: “Richtigkeit versus Wahrheit. Zum Sinn der 
Sollsgeltung moralisher Urteile und Normen.”, in (Habermas (1999): 271-319). 
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revealed by a hermeneutical explication of the normative presuppositions embedded in the 
interpretation. 
 Still, I regard the analytic distinctions of Habermas as both useful and important. To some 
extent, one could certainly distinguish between a descriptive and a normative approach to norms. 
The descriptive approach would be conducted with a minimum of evaluative terms, for example 
by describing differences in income between different professions without evaluating the 
differences in terms of “better” and “worse”. Still, a purely non-evaluative description would 
probably be difficult to maintain even in such cases. Descriptive practises will rather be a matter 
of approximation to an "ideal of description". Further on: when dealing with extreme cases, like 
the description of the norms and actions of neo-Nazi-groups, a “purely” descriptive approach will 
probably give rise to ethical implications that can not be ignored by the scientific community. 
The theoretical discourse will, therefore, not be sharply distinguishable from the practical 
discourse at the real level. 
  
2.2 Hermeneutics and claims of validity: 
Hermeneutics itself does not, however, explicate any given norms that ought to be given priority 
in a hermeneutic interpretation of a text or a social context. It does not provide scientists with any 
explicit criterions of criticism. Hermeneutics will, however, still serve as a valuable interpretative 
tool: 
Hermeneutics may explicate the norms given in a neo-Nazi-group, and may also explicate 
the counter-norms in use by a group of researchers making a problematic judgement of the norms 
at work in the neo-Nazi-group. As such, hermeneutics can be a useful tool in explicating the 
normative prejudices of any (con)text, but does not itself specify the normative conditions that 
should a priorically be presupposed by a critical interpretation. By turning to Apel’s 
appropriation of hermeneutics within his transcendental-pragmatic position, we are turning to the 
questions of validity as well as criticism.  
 In a more recent paper, Die Hermeneutische Dimension von Sozialwissenschaft und ihre 
normative Grundlage (Apel (1994)), Apel turns to the question of the connection between 
hermeneutics and transcendental pragmatics. His point of departure is the Erklären-Verstehen-
Kontroverse of the early human sciences of the 19th century, bringing forward the parallel 
controversies of the first part of the 20th century. Social sciences, he points out, rely on 
explanatory as well as understanding-oriented approaches. Apel turns the focus to the historical 
and normative traits of the social sciences, and points out the relevance of the hermeneutic 
approach. Hermeneutics takes the normative content of scientific perspectives into consideration. 
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By explicating the normative presuppositions inherent in different interpretations, hermeneutics 
will serve the function of being a clarificatory device within the social sciences. In a certain way, 
it seems like hermeneutics is even given a higher-order priority than explanatory approaches 
within Apel’s account. Interesting enough, this might be due to the higher-order priority given to 
the consensual criterions of truth claims within the discourse theory. 
 The model Apel works out, is a subject-subject-object-model of scientific investigation. 
The subject - co-subject - relationship (Subjekt-Kosubjekt) and the subject-object-relationship 
work as complementary relations within this model. The subject - co-subject - relationship seems 
to be given a certain priority within Apelian thinking, given his focus on the criterion of 
consensus. Claims to truth, as well as claims to rightness, can only be vindicated within the 
subject-co-subject-model of scientific knowledge, and thereby “truth” can never be conceived 
from the solitary individual’s point of view (cf. Apel’s remarks on “methodischer Solipsismus” in 
(Apel (1979): 16, 96) and (Apel (1973): 209)). “Truth”, in the scientific sense of the word, 
depends utterly upon the condition of intersubjective agreement about what should count as truth. 
 His choice of words does in fact indicate his concern with the intersubjective realm of 
knowledge. First, along with Habermas, he points out that the four validity-claims are operative 
within any argumentative discourse. Then, he stresses the connection between the different 
claims: 
1) The first claim, intelligibility, refers to intersubjectively valid meaning. This basic, linguistic 
form of understanding implies a common understanding of the linguistic terms used, and works 
as the precondition for the other three claims: 
2) The claim to truth, that works as a claim for universal consensus about truth claims. 
3) The claim to sincerity and truthfulness, that each speech act must contain when forwarding 
truth- (and rightness-) claims.  
And, interesting enough: 
4) The claim to normative rightness, which must be implicitly at work in any speech act, also 
when we are aspiring towards an agreement about truth claims. 
 
The fourth claim may indicate a difficulty with keeping questions of truth and rightness 
apart. This may give rise to a certain ambiguity in Apel's position, as if even assertoric statements 
within strictly nomological and explanatory sciences, like physics, were to be understood as 
intermixed with implicit claims to normative rightness. Yet, at another, higher-order level, the 
normativity Apel is pointing to in this respect is the normative presuppositions of the discourse 
itself. The claims to sincerity/truthfulness, intelligibility, etc., work as “norms” at a meta-
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normative level. At this meta-normative level, the claims to intelligibility, truth, sincerity and 
rightness must be supported by yet two other unavoidable conditions, the conditions of symmetry 
and reciprocity (cf., also, Apel (1997): 87). These meta-normative conditions work as universal 
and necessary conditions in any discourse, included the theoretical one. As “meta-norms” they 
also work as certain normative conditions within any discourse. A theoretical discourse may get 
disrupted if a member claims that his/her arguments are not dealt with as thoroughly as the 
arguments of other participants. This would either turn the theoretical discourse into a dialogue 
on unequal terms, or possibly turn the theoretical discourse into a practical one while dealing 
with questions of appropriateness (rightness). 
In yet another way, normativity implies specific claims to rightness that can be 
“externally” linked to questions of fact. Pure facts of economical transactions may involve 
negative consequences within the sphere of ecology, pure facts of chemistry could be used for 
beneficiary means within the industry of pharmaceutics, and so on. Theoretical discourses are not 
“theoretical” by excluding the connection to the “outer” social and objective world10. Theoretical 
discourses work as discourse-practices by conducting speech acts leading to given co-ordinations 
of actions in the “outer world”, thereby implying that possible normative questions could be 
linked to the actions.11  In discourse practices, i.e.; “real communities of communication”, 
theoretical approaches will include certain practices, either of the instrumental kind linked to the 
technical inventions in the objective world, or the communicative/strategic kind linked to the 
realm of intersubjective relations and co-ordination of actions.12 
The social sciences do, however, present themselves as a special case in this respect. A 
pure theory is highly unlikely to be produced within disciplines like sociology and political 
science. Even “economic” models of “rational choice” or “game theory” will involve certain 
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 Here, I am making use of Habermas’s terminology and distinctions between the ”subjective”, ”objective” and 
”social” world-orientations (Habermas (1997): 52-53,  88-95). 
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 In order to avoid any misunderstandings: the term ”discourse theory” refers to the general theory of discourses, 
whether theoretical, practical or explicative, while ”discourse practices” refers to the ”real” realm of discourses, 
meaning ”real communities of communication”, in Apel’s terms. The terms ”theoretical discourse” and ”practical 
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 The linkage between causal explanation and intentional action could be exemplified by looking at the connection 
between nuclear research and the innovation of nuclear weapons, showing that theoretical research as such can be 
value neutral, but will lose its value-neutrality when becoming subject to political decisions and actions. A pragmatic 
dimension is linked to causal explanations, given the intended application/usage (Ger. Anwendung) of given 
theoretical results. If the usage works as the incentive for conducting theoretical studies, exemplified by the close 
connection between private economic interests and public research within the chemical industry, then the 
explanatory part of the theoretical sciences will serve as a foundational, but not dominant part of the research 
process. For Apel’s analysis of the connection between the explanatory and innovative parts of the research process, 
see (Apel (1979): esp. the notes at pp. 278-279 and 252). For the relevance of the Erklären:Verstehen-kontroverse 
within the social sciences, cf., esp., (Apel (1979): part III: 2). 
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normative presuppositions, like the presupposition of rational actors in terms of an ego-centric 
means-end oriented rationality. The intermixture of theoretical and practical discourses will 
probably be the dominant feature of the social sciences. Statistics seems to form an exception, in 
terms of presenting facts in numerical terms, but will nevertheless be a part of the interpretative 
practices of the sciences. A rise in suicide rates does not, simply, present itself as a bundle of 
numerical statements about facts, but presents a social problem which needs to be interpreted in 
terms of social change. The interpretation could rely on macro-theoretical perspectives of social 
and historical change, involving certain normative presuppositions, like the aforementioned 
concept of anomie. The point is, therefore: even if it is possible to maintain a sharp distinction 
between theoretical and practical discourses at the analytic, let us say theoretical level, scientific 
practices will not offer us the advantage of upholding a sharp distinction at the practical level. 
Nevertheless, the difference between facts and norms is important to keep in mind. Facts 
are not inherently normative, but are linked to norms whenever linked to normative questions. In 
spite of this basic difference between theoretical and practical discourses, their common ground 
is given by the ideal conditions of the discourse. Consensus works as the ultimate validation-
ground of any discourse proper, whether descriptive or normative.  
Additionally, it will be important to keep the difference between the “ideal community of 
communication” and the various “real communities of communication” in mind. The justification 
of the argumentative conditions at the ideal level is not to be confused with a possible vindication 
of these conditions within a “real community of communication”. “The ideal community of 
communication” states the conditions and presuppositions which must be vindicated if a 
discourse is going to accomplish a valid consensus on given truth- and rightness claims. Whether 
these preconditions are vindicated or not within real communities of communication, will be an 
open question and a matter of fallible interpretation. Hermeneutical approaches dealing with “real 
communities of communication” can not escape from this fallibilism. By turning to the topic of 
meta-norms as a validational and critical device within the social sciences, the question raised 
will, hence, be: how is a (valid) critical hermeneutics possible? 
 
2.3  A hermeneutics with a critical intent. 
 The (four) validity claims and (2) validity conditions employ a double function within 
transcendental pragmatics. As validation ground, the “ideal community of communication” 
represents the ideal conditions that real communities have to fulfil, if a valid consensus is to be 
established. As a standard for critique, it works as a regulative ideal for the critical evaluation of 
obstacles within real communities. The difference between the real and ideal level is fundamental 
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to Apel’s approach. The ideal level serves as the foundational ground of justification. 
Justification is made on a reflexive basis. The meta-norms themselves are justified via negativa, 
by showing that any violation of any of them would create a defective consensus, a de facto, non-
valid agreement. The fundamental difference between the ideal and real level also creates a 
fundamental difference between justification and application. The meta-norms themselves can be 
ultimately justified and conceptually clarified at the ideal level, but only approximately fulfilled 
at the real level. This approximation is due to a principal validation problem at the real level. One 
could never verify the fulfilment of the conditions at the real level. And, even an (alleged) 
approximate fulfilment of the ideal conditions within a research community may result in a 
reasonable disagreement about the subject discussed.  
 The relevance of hermeneutics might actually be strengthened by this principal validation-
problem. Given no “final agreement” at the real level, and given the acceptance of “reasonable 
disagreements”, a plurality of interpretations might be the result within a research community. 
While the “ideal community of communication” is based on universalism, meaning an ultimate 
justification of the universal conditions of reaching understanding, the real level seems to be 
entangled with pluralism and relativism. 
 Here, the key term “approximation” of Apel must be kept in mind. The purpose of 
critique will be to enhance the potentials of mutual recognition in any real community of 
communication, in order to make it approximate the conditions of the ideal. A hermeneutics 
guided by an ideal standard for critique will, therefore, be conducted as a “hermeneutics of 
suspicion”, pointing negatively at the obstacles in any real community in order to make the ideal 
conditions come through. This form of critical hermeneutics will not escape the fallibilism of 
interpretative approaches. It will, however, be guided by a universalistic standard, restricting the 
possible amount of critical interpretations to those critical interpretations which do not contradict 
the conditions of the ideal level. Let me elucidate this last point: 
A critique not based on the principle of individual autonomy embedded in transcendental 
pragmatics, will not be a “critique proper”. “Symmetry and reciprocity” are not conditions 
realizable between collective actors, but only realizable between individual actors. A collective 
actor may, after all, contradict the conditions of symmetry and reciprocity by inhabiting non-
reciprocal and asymmetric relationships between its various members. This point is embedded in 
any (theoretical or practical) discourse. Related to practical discourses, it applies to the extended 
principle of “U” as well. The principle of universalisation would be violated, if the participant 
concerned by a norm turned out to be a “collective participant” consisting of non-mutual and 
asymmetric relationships. A non-mutable principle of individual autonomy can, hence, be 
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extracted from the meta-normative conditions of the ideal community of communication. 
Symmetry and reciprocity can not work without the individual autonomy of each participant in a 
discourse. This works as a minimal formulation of the basic conditions of “the ideal community 
of communication”. 
  
III Meta-norms as critical devices: application on concrete cases. 
3.1  An example: A participatory model of democracy. 
 Before I make a further elaboration on the relationship between transcendental pragmatics 
and hermeneutics, I will make use of an example in order to clarify the critical usage of the 
transcendental-pragmatic meta-norms. The example chosen is based on a transcendental-
pragmatic approach to theories of democracy within political science. We will exclusively be 
dealing with normative political theory, although I will point out the linkage between normative 
and “factual” questions in the final sections. 
 Adela Cortina’s main question in Diskursethik und partizipatorische Demokratie is 
whether the ideal conditions of  ”the ideal community of communication” could work as ideal 
conditions in a model of democracy. The title of the paper suggests a close linkage between 
democracy and discourse. However, certain problems arise when one tries to match “discourse” 
with “democracy”. Transcendental pragmatics does, after all, make strong claims for individual 
participation in the discourse. The principle of “U” does, explicitly, presuppose that the 
individual is indispensable and non-representational, and that anyone concerned by a norm ought 
to have the possibility of taking part in a discourse. “In principle” can not be read as “an equal 
right to take part, but not equal opportunity to take part, due to various socio-economic 
constraints”. At the ideal level, non-representationality is formulated as indispensable. 
Transcendental pragmatics, therefore, seems to work in favour of a participatory model of 
democracy. 
 Participatory models, however, seem to be more realistic and realizable at small-group 
levels within societies, than at the general level of national government. Representative 
democracies are, evidently enough, representative and not participatory. The individuals are 
given the equal rights to take part, but only through representation. The Athenian ideal of 
participation seems to be a utopian, and therefore useless, ideal. In which sense, then, could the 
meta-norms function as a critical device applied to the political realm? 
 Cortina emphasizes the principal difference between the ideal and real level(s), and also 
points out, along with Apel, that application will be a matter of approximation. Participation is, 
and ought to be, an ideal in western democracies. The democracies should therefore, as far as 
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possible, try to expand the participatory potentials. She, nevertheless, views the participatory 
model as less applicable to the political sphere of parliament and government than to the sphere 
of public debate. Citizens may always be able to partake to a higher degree in public debates, and 
within this realm, direct participation is possible (Cortina (1993): 255).  
Cortina’s viewpoint is based upon the gradualist premise within the applied level of 
discourse ethics: the participatory levels of "real communities of communication" may always be 
enhanced, even if one will never be able to reach a full-scale realization. This gradualism may, I 
think, be applied to the political sphere of parliamentary representation as well13. Examples could 
be easily given: minorities should (through their own representatives) be given the right to take 
part in democratic decisions concerning themselves. Local elections have, likewise, been 
considered as a device to bring political matters closer to the voters, thereby enhancing their 
influence upon political decisions. Hence, small-scale-wise, one could extend the participatory 
potential of the political society. Along with Cortina, the participatory ideal will never be 
realizable in the fullest sense. The participatory ideal could, nevertheless, work as critical 
corrective to given practices. As I would like to point out: this critical corrective can be given on 
Apel’s terms by taking into the consideration the obstacles given in any context. By taking the 
approximation-principle within Apel’s position into consideration, the regulative function of the 
participatory ideal may be more appropriately formulated in the following way: critique will be 
conducted by identifying the obstacles to the optimum approximation to the ideal of participation. 
 I will expand this example in a hermeneutic direction, since a reasonable as well as 
unreasonable disagreement may result from any debate on the ideal of participation and the 
optimum level of approximation to this ideal. Even if a discourse could reach a mutual agreement 
about the importance of a maximum participation, the “optimum approximation” will probably 
be an issue of disagreement. Different degrees of participation could be acceptable, given the 
normative laden standpoints of different discourse-members. Hence, even if a debate on the 
optimum degrees of participation in a representative democracy would result in reasonable 
agreement, the obstacles given to the realization of the optimum participation may still be subject 
to a reasonable disagreement. Differences in educational and income levels may serve as 
obstacles to participation in representative democracies, even when “participation” is defined at a 
low-approximation-level as “taking part as a voter in general elections” and “taking part in 
organisational and lobbyist activities”. Reasonable disagreement might arise about the definition 
of participation. “Equal opportunities to take part” might be opposed to “distributional justice”-
                                                 
13
 By a mistake, I applied this viewpoint to Cortina in my original paper. She is, in fact, sceptical to the possibility of 
applying the participatory model to representationist practices.   
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versions of justice, since versions of “distributional justice” might be considered to take care of 
the material conditions of the ability to take part. Evidently, this kind of disagreement could be 
linked to political-ideological differences between the participants of the discourse along the 
right-wing and left-wing scale of politics. In addition: since matters-of–fact, like social statistics, 
might be part of the discussion, this “practical discourse” would also be a “theoretical discourse”. 
Questions of truth and rightness will be combined by taking into consideration the importance of 
relying on results from empirical research in order to identify possible obstacles to a given 
definition of “the optimum level of participation”.   
 The key-concepts of gradualism and meliorism can easily be applied to this example, 
since the concept of approximation implies a gradual improvement of the conditions of 
“symmetry and reciprocity” within the real communities of communication. This is based upon 
the further presupposition that it will always be possible to improve the conditions at the real 
level, although not to the ultimate extent (cf. (Skirbekk, G. (1992): 157ff.))14. 
 
3.2 Intermediate reflections. Hermenutics as “double hermeneutics”.  “Double 
hermeneutics” as “double critical hermeneutics”.15 
Hermeneutics would serve as a valuable device in a scientific discourse like the one exemplified 
above, since this kind of scientific argument would be in need of conceptual clarification as well 
as a “normative clarification”. A normative clarification would imply the explication of the 
normative presuppositions (“prejudices”) made by each participant in the discourse. This kind of 
normative clarification/explication could be conducted at different levels within social sciences.  
A critical hermeneutics would depend on criterions of critique. These criterions could not 
be relativized within the scientific discourse, without losing their status as “universal criterions of 
critique”. This is the intention of connecting hermeneutics to transcendental pragmatics. A 
critical explication of given normative presuppositions could thereby be performed. Given that 
the “ideal community of communication” could function as a set of critical meta-norms for 
evaluating whether given “real communities” did conform to the ideal conditions, a critical 
application of justified meta-norms could be accomplished. 
 Another example could serve the purpose of clarification. The example given above is 
focusing on a “real community of communication” at a macro-level of society. Clearly enough, 
the given conditions of symmetry and reciprocity will be easier applicable on, and realizable 
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 See, also, ”Ethical Gradualism?”, in (Skirbekk, Gunnar (1992): 89-126). 
15
 Cf. (Habermas (1997): 110), for Habermas’s remarks on Anthony Giddens’s “double hermeneutics”, as well as 
Giddens’s in (Giddens (1977): 79-80, 162). For Habermas’s remarks to Gadamer in this volume, cf. (Habermas 
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within, the micro-levels of society, such as small-scale democracies at schools, universities or 
working-places. I will make use of a small-scale group in my next example, in order to clarify the 
relationship between meta-norms as validity-conditions and meta-norms as critical standard 
within “the real community” of scientists, and clarify the application of meta-normative criterions 
on another real community, such as a neo-Nazi-group.  
 
3.3 An example from contemporary Norwegian sociology. 
Katrine Fangen’s Ph.D. thesis was based on a field-study of a neo-Nazi group in Norway16. Due 
to her usage of the method of participatory observation, this empirical study can serve as a model 
example of the validity concerns as well as the critical concerns of a hermeneutics guided by 
transcendental-pragmatic criterions. The field-study gives rise to truth-oriented as well as 
rightness-oriented problems. Fangen herself got concerned about the dilemmas that could result 
from the close contact with the neo-Nazis: evidently so, because neo-Nazi groups do not always 
act according to the legal rules of the society. A certain clash may be expected to take place, 
between the norms of the group itself on the one hand, and the norms of the society at large and 
the community of scientists on the other. As Fangen notes, tolerance is not the key value of neo-
Nazis. On the contrary, neo-Nazi attitudes of intolerance towards other cultures and races may be 
conceived as a threat to ethnic minorities, as well as to the society at large, by giving rise to 
violent actions. The field-study, hence, serves as an exemplary case of a conflict between the 
norms of the scientific community and the community under investigation. The scientific norms 
of tolerance and peaceful conflict solution through reasonable argumentation are easily contrasted 
with the norms of intolerance and violent conflict solution. 
The remarks so far do not do justice to the complex structure of this example. Given that the 
example should be able to illustrate the validity-conditions as well as the meta-normative 
criterions of Apel's transcendental-pragmatic approach, and also be able to illustrate the relevance 
of a hermeneutical approach in a critical sociology, we must take the following topics into 
consideration. 
 
1) Dealing with the problem of validity:          
In an alleged symmetrical and reciprocal relationship, the researchers will naively presuppose 
the intelligibility of the utterances of one another, and will, likewise, naively presuppose the 
                                                                                                                                                              
(1997): 133-136). Habermas did not, however, expand the theme on “double hermeneutics” in a double-critical 
direction.  
16
 See Fangen, Katrine: Pride and power: a sociological study of the Norwegian radical nationalist underground 
movement. (Department of Sociology, University of Oslo, 2000). 
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sincerity of one another. Further on, each person must presuppose that the claims to truth and 
rightness will be explorable by argumentative means, meaning that the arguments could be 
complied to, or rejected to, on a rational basis.  
Questions of validity are, however, not totally separable from questions of critique. Let 
me put it in this way: they are neatly separable analytically, but not pragmatically. 
Transcendental pragmatics could serve as a continuous critical device within a community of 
researchers, by presupposing that each researcher himself/herself would be willing to conduct 
a self-critical reflection in order to make the norm of impartiality operative. This self-critical 
reflection could be expanded from the 1st to the 2nd person’s perspective, by reflecting on 
possible obstacles to impartiality and equal opportunities within the scientific community, 
caused by professional inequalities and/or personal conflicts.  
In order to simplify the matter in this case, let us assume that the different members of the 
scientific community are in symmetrical and reciprocal relationships to each other. 
2) Dealing with the first level of critique:               
Given that the validity-conditions are vindicated within the community of scientists, we could 
ask ourselves: in which sense do the norms of the scientific community conform to the meta-
norms of discourse? The norms of “tolerance” and “peaceful problem-solving” serve as the 
specific norms that the scientist confronts the neo-Nazi norms with. Apparently, being non-
contradictory to the meta-norms of discourse, these scientific norms could serve as specific 
criterions in a critical-normative approach to neo-Nazi conduct. The abstract formula of 
“symmetry and reciprocity” at the meta-normative level could serve as a clarifying tool when 
explicating the specific and lower-order normative content of given norms in a given 
scientific community. Presuming that another scientific society would adhere to a more 
positive attitude to Nazi conduct that this one, the need for an explication of the norms of the 
scientific community would be more acute. 
3) Dealing with the second level of critique:                   
Do the norms of the given (neo-Nazi) community conform to the meta-norms of discourse? 
The answer is apparently: no. In order to explicate the double structure of norms at stake, one 
could first ask: do the norms of the scientific community conform to the meta-norms? Given 
that the answer is “yes”, one would ask further: in which sense could these norms serve as a 
critical device when analysing the norms of the group under investigation? If these questions 
were related to the example of the field-study, the answers might be self-evident, given the 
premises delivered so far: the norms of the neo-Nazi group are apparently not conforming to 
the norms of the scientists, and evidently not to the meta-norms of the discourse. 
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3.4 The neo-Nazi case: a closer examination. 
I will examine the case further by taking Fangen's remarks about her own study into 
consideration. In a recent paper, “”Radical nationalism”. What are the key contemporary 
conceptual and theoretical issues?”, Fangen presents two different perspectives on racism from 
contemporary sociology. The British sociologist Martin Barker (Fangen (2000): 157) makes a 
distinction between two forms of racism, the “new racism” and the “classical” one. The classical 
form is defined as “discriminating”, while the new form is “differentiating”. This model claims 
that neo-Nazi17 groups will cling to the new form. The “old racism” had discriminatory attitudes 
against other cultures/races by considering them to be inferior to their own (white, European) 
one. The “new racism”, on the other hand, is distinguishing between different cultures on an 
egalitarian basis: different cultures are even considered to be at the same cultural level. These 
“new racists” do, hence, not discriminate according to race, but differentiate according to culture. 
According to this model, neo-Nazi aggression will result from the claim that every cultural group 
should “stick to their own land” (Fangen (2000): 158), on an egalitarian basis.   
The field-study of Fangen does, interesting enough, contradict the claims of this model. 
The neo-Nazis do, on the one hand, consider their own attitudes to be “differentiating”, not 
“discriminating”. They do not label themselves “racist”, since they claim to be dealing with 
cultural, and not racial, differences. However, by confronting them with current examples, like 
the example of South Africa, they start to contradict themselves. They do not support the 
liberation of the black population, and they do not accept the loss of white superiority (Fangen 
(2000): 158). A certain “classic” form of racial discrimination seems to be part of their world-
view, and in this case, even by reducing culture to race. In the course of communication, the 
attitude of “egalitarian differentiation” is replaced with an attitude of “non-egalitarian 
discrimination”.  
A certain “reasonable disagreement” seems to exist within the “community of scientists” 
(Fangen and Barker). The model of Barker does not only claim to represent two different racist 
attitudes at a purely idealized (Weberian ideal-type) level, but does also claim that these attitudes 
correspond to a real level: to the attitudes of the “old” Nazis of the 2nd World War and the 
attitudes of the post-war, “new” Nazis. 
By making use of the distinction between 1st, 2nd and 3rd person’s perspectives, the 
example gives rise to interesting questions. A field-study based on participatory as well as 
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 Fangen prefers the term ”radical nationalism” to ”neo-Nazism”. I will simplify the matter by, consequently, 
making use of the term “neo-Nazism”, since the groups discussed, in fact, do support Nazi world-views. 
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observational methods does in fact make use of a complex combination of these three 
perspectives. At the analytic, conceptual level, one could distinguish between communicative 
approaches of participation and non-communicative approaches of observation. The participatory 
approach amounts to a 2nd person’s communicative access to the viewpoints of the 1st person. The 
observational approach amounts to the detached spectator’s (3rd person’s) point of view18. At the 
factual level, these approaches will probably be strongly intermixed. The sociologist will not only 
depend on the utterances of the participants, but also depend on an observational approach to 
their actions. Given discrepancies might arise between different utterances from the neo-Nazis, 
and between speech and action, thereby requiring further questioning from the sociologist. A neo-
Nazi claiming to have a respectful attitude towards other cultures would certainly contradict 
himself/herself if approving of violent actions carried out by white South Africans against black 
South Africans. In that case, the sociologist could, still, accept the neo-Nazi as a communication 
partner on equal terms. The sociologist may, however, be criticizing the group because of the 
lacking coherency of speech, and may even comment upon the deficiencies of the neo-Nazi 
normative standards.  
The observational part of the field study does also play a vital part in this case, and should 
not be neglected. The aim of the sociologist is not to reach an agreement with the neo-Nazis 
about racial issues. The primary aim is to produce a scientific study, reaching an agreement with 
other scientists about the status of neo-Nazi attitudes. The co-subject of communication must 
therefore also be conceived as an object of observation. A certain asymmetry does exist between 
the scientist and the neo-Nazi, even if the communication is mutual and oriented towards 
understanding. This communication inhabits an element of strategy, as well, since the mutuality 
of understanding serves as a device to gain more knowledge about the attitudes and norms of the 
group, and to produce scientific results. The means-end form of rationality of strategic action is, 
hence, linked to the purposes of the research. The strategy is, however, open, as long as the 
purposes of the research are not concealed from the group.  
In which sense could the meta-norms of discourse be operative within a field-study? By 
dealing with the validity claims as well as conditions of symmetry and reciprocity, this question 
divides into two distinct topics. A minimal understanding ought to be accomplished in the 
dialogue between the field-worker and the group under study. This minimal understanding 
presupposes the four presuppositions (validity-claims) of understanding-oriented communication, 
but does not have to be directed towards consensus19. By understanding the semantic content of 
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 On 1st-, 2nd - and 3rd - person perspectives, see (Apel (1979): 215-216, 278-282). 
19
 On understanding versus consensus, cf. (Habermas (1999): 116).  
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the utterances of the neo-Nazi, and by presupposing the truthfulness and orientedness towards 
truth and rightness, the sociologist does not have to agree with the neo-Nazi. She must 
presuppose that the neo-Nazi is truthful about his/her own ideas about truth and rightness, but she 
does not have to convert to their ideas, as they do not have to convert to her (and the community 
of scientists’) norms and ideas. An attitude of indifferent impartiality is even expected as part of 
the scientific approach. A purely descriptive approach would, however, be difficult to carry 
through. Not because it is impossible to carry through a descriptive approach within the social 
sciences, but because a purely descriptive approach is likely to result in ethical dilemmas in a 
case like this. Obviously, the neo-Nazi group represents an extreme case. Most social groups will 
probably not produce any serious amount of ethical dilemmas within the scientific community. 
Let me conduct a short thought-experiment to clarify my point:  
The norms of the neo-Nazis could be treated as “facts” in describable terms. Different 
racist attitudes could be analysed and classified, without involving any evaluative concerns from 
the scientist’s point of view. Different actions could be observed and described, without making 
any judgement in terms of better or worse, right or wrong. Norms may be treated as “facts”, in a 
classificatory manner. Discriminatory ideas could be referred to, without judging them in terms 
of “better” or “worse”. So, even in this case, a purely objectifying attitude may be conducted, by 
not taking the ethical implications of the “given” norms, attitudes and actions into consideration. 
Anyway: a professionalised attitude of indifference towards the norms and values of the group 
would represent an objectifying attitude that would contradict the idea of a critical approach. The 
objectifying, descriptive approach would have to be supplemented with a normative-critical 
judgement in order to conform to the ideal of a critical, social science. 
Turning to the question of critique: the critical, hermeneutical approach is not necessarily 
opposed to the idea that norms could be treated as facts. It maintains, however, that norms carry a 
normative content that should be evaluated, given that the intent of the science is a critical intent. 
An objectifying approach could be conducted in order to classify the norms of the group, in terms 
of the classificatory scheme of traditional versus new racist ideas. The critical approach would 
nevertheless take the normative content into consideration, treating norms as criticizable validity 
(truth- and rightness) claims, using meta-norms as critical standard. The old form of racism is 
evidently not in terms of the ideal conditions of symmetry and reciprocity. Not even the new 
form of racism could be conforming to the ideal of reciprocity and symmetry, since it works as a 
principle of exclusion along national borders, and since “new racists” may promote violent 
actions against foreigners and ideological adversaries. The neo-Nazis are not likely to enter into a 
 21
discourse with members from other cultures (or anti-racist groups) in order to discuss the 
different world-views on equal terms.  
Symmetry and reciprocity will work as standard for an evaluation of the internal relations 
within the group, as well. The basic premises of the neo-Nazi world-view are probably not laid 
open for discussion within the group, either. The alleged symmetric relationships between 
different neo-Nazis20 will probably be contradicted by argumentative practises. A principal 
openness towards the viewpoints of other members of the group is not likely to be expected 
among neo-Nazis. A neo-Nazi would probably not be allowed to convert to a non-Nazi world-
view. He/she would, most likely, be threatened by sanctions. Neither the basic condition of 
reciprocity, nor the condition of symmetry, is to be fulfilled. 
This “meta-study-study” may easily be extended. Let me carry the thought-experiments a 
bit further. The sociologist herself/himself may conduct an interpretation of the power-structures 
given internally in the group. This might be done by “observing” informal leadership structures, 
comparing them to the “formal” leadership or egalitarian structures of the group. The neo-Nazi-
group may very well present itself as an egalitarian and democratic group, but the factual speech 
acts might reveal structures of command and obedience. The sociologist might confront the neo-
Nazis with the lack of consistency between speech and action, or prefer to leave the observations 
to the scientific debate. Here, the close connection between observation and 
communication/participation is made apparent. 
These last remarks also point to the difference between the two “real communities of 
communication”.  Consensus is the primary aim of the scientific discourse. Understanding, not 
consensus, is the primary aim of the sociologist taking part in the neo-Nazi group.  The members 
of the neo-Nazi group might, or might not, be oriented towards understanding and agreement. A 
"traditional racist group" might favour coercion, not consensus, thereby only accepting the kind 
of agreement resulting from the excessive use of threats of sanctions, and thereby not accepting 
the basic argumentative conditions in the first place. 
  
3.5 Hermeneutics and transcendental pragmatics: some clarifying remarks. 
By adhering to the hermeneutical language of Gadamer, the meta-norms of transcendental 
pragmatics could be labelled as "critical prejudices". These critical prejudices could be given the 
function of normative conditions, used as an evaluative standard when exploring the symmetry 
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 The neo-Nazi groups labelling themselves ”Skinheads” claim to have no leadership, according to Fangen (Fangen 
(2001): 153). However, de facto communicative practices might reveal informal leadership-functions also among 
Skinheads. It is easy to imagine different examples that might contradict this claim.  Newcomers are probably not to 
be in charge, nor allowed to give commands to others.  
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and reciprocity potentials of the given norms of a social group. Within Gadamer's traditional 
hermeneutics, these prejudices are not to be given a higher-order status compared to the norms of 
other groups. The justification of the critical prejudices would be conducted by other prejudices, 
and these other prejudices would simply be part of a tradition. The ultimate justification of Apel 
is not compatible with the Gadamerian priority of tradition. Different traditions might be opposed 
to each other, based upon their diverging and traditionally justified norms, but none of these 
traditions could be given priority. Within a purely hermeneutical perspective, the norms 
(prejudices) of the scientific group would not be able to conquer the norms of the neo-Nazis. The 
meta-norms may just be considered to be an idealized version of the norms of the scientific 
community. This is the strongest relativistic version of Gadamer: a hermeneutics entangled by 
"radical relativism". Critique can not be given any strong foundation within this version.21 
The arguments in favour of an ultimate justification of the meta-norms point to their 
inevitability in any argumentation directed towards an agreement about specific truth- and 
rightness claims. Consensus proper is the criterion of truth as well as rightness, and the meta-
norms could not be violated without producing defective forms of agreement, whereby self-
referential inconsistencies as well as performative contradictions produced by the participants 
themselves prove the agreement to be defective and non-valid (cf. (Hedberg (2005)).  
 An example could easily be given, by conducting a thought-experiment related to the 
case-study of the neo-Nazi group. The neo-Nazis themselves might consider their world-views to 
be egalitarian and differentiating, not discriminatory, towards other cultures. The sociologist 
might accept these world-views without further questioning, or choose to examine the normative 
presuppositions ("prejudices") of the neo-Nazis by asking further questions, as she in fact did. 
The example of South Africa proved their world-views to be far more discriminating and 
"traditionally racist" than previously assumed. If the neo-Nazis do consider other ethnic groups to 
be inferior, and still maintain to have an egalitarian and non-discriminatory world-view, this 
would certainly reveal inconsistencies between their different statements. If they claim to be 
egalitarian and non-discriminatory, but engage in violent actions against non-white citizens, they 
would demonstrate inconsistency between speech and action.  
If they, on the other hand, did express "traditional racist" world-views and promoted 
"traditional racist" actions, they would be self-referentially consistent as well as performatively 
non-contradictory. The formal features of their speech and action would be in accordance with 
the aforementioned four validity-claims. The neo-Nazis may even fulfil the conditions of the 
discourse by being in an (alleged) symmetric and reciprocal relationship to each other. The 
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 For the relativism of Gadamer’s position, cf., esp., (Apel (1997)), as well as Gadamer’s reply in (Gadamer (1997)).  
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content of their speech (i.e.; their given norms and attitudes) would, nevertheless, be in conflict 
with the "general content" of the meta-norms. “Symmetry” and “reciprocity” would not be 
applicable to the relations between the neo-Nazis and their "enemies" (foreigners). Neo-Nazi 
attitudes and norms would simply preclude a mutual (and symmetric) relationship. A critical 
application of the discursive meta-norms does, therefore, point to the formal as well as the 
material features of speech and action. As validity-conditions, they point to the formal features of 
discourse, given by the dual conditions and the four validity-claims. As critical device, they also 
point to the content of speech and action, by explicating whether this content is conforming to the 
meta-norms or not.22 
 An argument from absurdity might prove the point: if the sociologist herself were to reach 
an agreement with the neo-Nazis, leading to an acceptance of the neo-Nazi world-views, she 
would have to dispense with the meta-norms of symmetry and reciprocity. She would have to 
accept asymmetric and non-reciprocal relationships between different cultural groups. She would 
also have to accept the dogmas of the neo-Nazi world-view, and dispense with the idea of a 
discursive vindication of world-views. She would have to dispense with the formal as well as 
material implications of the transcendental-pragmatic conditions. 
 
IV Hermeneutics: an explicatory device within the social sciences. 
4.1 The relevance of hermeneutics at different levels. 
Dealing explicitly with the question of critique in this essay, the closing sections will 
focus more explicitly on the relevance of hermeneutics within the social sciences. The problem 
with hermeneutics is, I think, the lack of specificity linked to the hermeneutical approach. 
Hermeneutics seems to give a loose guidance to the understanding of meaning, without 
supporting the sciences with definitive criterions, devices or even "methods" for a "proper" 
hermeneutical approach. Nevertheless, I believe that Gadamer's concepts of tradition and 
prejudice will be valuable and useful keys in a meaning-oriented science, and that the specific 
application of these concepts at different levels within the social sciences will compensate for the 
abstractive character of these concepts.  
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 Contrary to Habermas, Apel maintains that the meta-normative conditions can not be regarded as morally neutral. 
Symmetry and reciprocity imply the equal rights and co-responsibility for the equal rights of one another.  Meta-
norms do not only have implications for the internal relations within a community of scientists, but also for the 
relationship between the group of scientists and the external society. Completely neutral conditions of reaching 
consensus can not be formulated, cf. (Apel (1999): 89-90, 42-51). 
 24
The concept of tradition is far-stretched within Gadamer's thinking. The world history as 
such could be included in one, grand "tradition", including modernity as well as post-modernity. 
Modernity and post-modernity could be conceived as two (not sharply distinguishable) 
"traditions" within the larger tradition. Within the sciences, the concept of tradition could be 
applied to different sciences as well as the differing traditions within one science. In this sense, it 
would work as a loose version of the concept of paradigm. Durkheimian approaches could work 
as one tradition within sociology contrasted with other (such as Weberian or Parsonian) 
approaches. At this macro-theoretical level, the concept of tradition could serve as a valuable 
device, presupposing that each one of these macro-theoretical approaches does intend to present a 
unitary and coherent interpretation of historical and social change, without being provable as 
such. Macro-levels of theory do, in fact, rely more heavily upon interpretation than upon 
observed phenomena. They rely on the initial interpretations of social and historical change made 
by the author himself/herself, as well as the interpretations made by the sociologists reading the 
author's work.  
Micro-levels of theory, like the model of Barker, are more easily related to empirical 
studies, like the material of the field-study. A hermeneutical approach in terms of explication of 
meaning is necessary even at this level, given the communicative approach of the scientist. Given 
that the observational level will give minimal information about the world-views of the neo-
Nazis, the scientist will rely more heavily upon the meaning-oriented approach.  Another insight 
from Gadamer might be of high relevance to the social sciences. "The priority of the question"23 
involved in the hermeneutical approach can be contrasted to the ideal of an observational science 
looking for inductively derived facts. The method of questioning was Fangen’s primary key to 
the world-views of the neo-Nazis. The questions asked were also, in a certain sense, prejudicial to 
the answers. An acceptance of the model of "new racism" might, “a priorically”, have led to the 
acceptance of the neo-Nazis as not discriminatory against other cultures. Further questioning was 
required in order to reveal certain discrepancies within the neo-Nazi world-view. An acceptance 
of the self-presentation of the neo-Nazis could, in that case, have been guided by "prejudices" 
inherent in the model of "traditional" versus "new racism", the presupposition that "new Nazis" 
conform to "new racism". This example also illustrates the complex relationship between macro- 
and micro-levels within the social sciences. The concepts of "traditional" and "new racism" do, 
after all, depend on macro-level interpretations of historical and social change. The empirical 
study of Fangen did, in a certain way, correct the idealized model of the two forms of racism. The 
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 Cf. "The hermeneutic priority of the question." in (Gadamer (1996): 362-381). Among other things, he wrote: 
"Discourse that is intended to reveal something requires that the thing be broken open by the question." (p. 363). 
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results of her study seem to depend more on an abductive level of questioning, than the inductive 
level of observation. 
So far, the hermeneutics guided by critical meta-norms has been connected to two 
different levels within the social sciences. At the level of theory I was explicitly dealing with 
normative, political theory exemplified by the model of participatory democracy. The empirical 
level was exemplified by the field-study of Fangen, which relied on the "qualitative" 
methodology of participatory observation. A critical hermeneutics may, as well, be extended to 
the material given by the quantitative methods of the social sciences. The abductive level within 
the quantitative realm of social statistics may be given priority by a focus upon the "priority of 
the question", in order to examine the given prejudices of a given questionary scheme. Such an 
examination may reveal alternative interpretations, as well as alternative questions to be raised in 
a questionary scheme. The empirical level of social statistics may, thus, be an area of 
hermeneutical explication as well. Within the empirical field, social statistics may even form a 
paradigmatic example of empirical data in need for interpretation. The hermeneutical explication 
of meaning does, hence, neither have to be restricted to the theoretical level of social sciences, 
nor to the qualitative methods.  
Given the limited space of any essay, I will not include the topic of statistics here, which 
may turn into a topic of vast range. In the next part, I will briefly turn to the question of 
functional explanations in sociological approaches. Functional explanations do, on the one hand, 
intend to explain phenomena in mainly descriptive terms. On the other hand, they serve as 
devices in the evaluation of social phenomena, by judging some phenomena to be 
“dysfunctional” to the society at large, while others are judged as “functional”. The dual concepts 
of “function” and “dysfunction” may be entirely neutral at a purely conceptual level, but may 
also carry normative presuppositions whenever applied to concrete cases. The example of neo-
Nazism will be useful in this respect, since the phenomenon of racism may be judged as 
functional as well as dysfunctional. Yet another example from contemporary, Norwegian 
sociology will be included in this part. Here, functional analysis is conducted at a theoretical and 
historically oriented level, related to the phenomenon of racism as part of the process of 
modernisation.  
 
4.2 The case of functional analysis. 
Returning to the initial remarks about Durkheim, it will be interesting to take a closer look 
at the views of a professor of sociology at the University of Oslo: Sigurd Skirbekk. He has 
adopted a negative stand towards the growing individualism of the modern/post-modern 
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societies. He maintains that the growing individualism implies a progressing disintegration of the 
European societies. Using the functionalist terminology, he claims that certain other features of 
this development, like declining birth rates, are dysfunctional to the societies of northern Europe, 
and symptomatic signs of disintegration and civilisational decline. He, further, claims that the 
populations of these areas will be endangered by immigration, threatening the already 
disintegrative cultures of Europe.24 And, further on, he claims that integration depends on 
different integrative forces, and that discrimination will be one of them (Skirbekk, S. (1997): 72-
3). He even asserts that racist attitudes may have this function.25 
From this viewpoint one could certainly ask: what is the status of the concepts of 
"function" and "dysfunction"? Certainly, they seem to work as explanatory concepts relating to 
observable phenomena26. Hermeneutically seen, however, they also seem to become carriers of a 
specific normative content when applied to specific cases. Returning to the field-study of Fangen, 
one could certainly ask whether the phenomenon of neo-Nazism could be characterized as 
functional or dysfunctional to the post-modern society.  
A closer look at the basic concepts of functional explanations should serve the purpose of 
clarifying this question. The dual concepts of manifest and latent functions are vital in this 
respect. In the case of the neo-Nazis, ‘integration’ may be viewed as the manifest function of 
neo-Nazi behaviour and attitudes towards other groups, such as foreigners. The attitudes 
expressed by the neo-Nazis may be taken to be the latent function at work. Within the realm of 
functional analysis, then, the latent function will be identified with the intentional and intended 
part of group behaviour: the part recognized by the group itself. The manifest function (here: 
“integration”) will, however, only be detectable from the observer’s standpoint, i.e., the 
standpoint of the social scientist(s). The normativity inherent in functional explanations will, 
apparently, be linked to the (scientific) evaluation of the manifest  functions, which are to be 
judged in terms of ‘positive’ or ‘negative’, i.e.; functional or dysfunctional. 
One of the crucial questions that have been raised in regard to the dual concepts of 
manifest and latent function has been: recognizable or non-recognizable by whom? (Giddens 
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 "If most societies within a civilization adjust to dysfunctional reproduction - as for the time being seems to be the 
case in Europe - other people from other civilizations can most certainly be expected to take over the land and the 
lead in a foreseeable future. It is the job of sociologist to say such things, even if this contradict basic assumptions in 
popular ideologies.", quotation from: Sigurd N. Skirbekk: "Limits of predictive power in an individually based 
political ideology. - Reflections upon some aspects of Swedish family policy", Presentation at the National 
Conference in Sociology, Røros, Norway 1993, also available at: http://www.uio.no/~sigurds/ 
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 "Racism, at least when presented in certain ways, could contribute to a strengthened national confidence of a given 
people.", Sigurd Skirbekk writes in (Skirbekk, S. (1998): 247).  Cf. the English translation: 
http://www.uio.no/~sigurds:  "Nationalism – Subject of Study and Term of Abuse". This version is available under 
the main link:  “Modern Nationalism". 
26
 Cf. Elster’s discussion of the explanatory function of “manifest functions” in (Elster (1990): 130). 
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(1996): 89; Elster (1990): 131). Here, I would like to link the question of normativity to this 
question, since the question of “recognizable by whom” also seems to involve the question of 
“negative or positive by whom?” On both questions, one could easily imagine disagreements 
between the group of scientists and the group under investigation, as well as between scientific 
colleagues. The first question seems to be easier to resolve, since the scientific (observer’s) 
judgment will gain priority over the layman’s point of view. The latent function of the group will 
therefore not be in conflict with the manifest one, since the latter one will be given higher-order 
priority. Nevertheless, since group behaviour hardly is to be subject to unitary observations, but 
rather interpretations, reasonable disagreements may arise between different scientists. 
Additionally, the demarcation line between manifest and latent functions is not easily discernible 
in the real course of communication and action. Since scientific viewpoints are available to the 
public, the group itself may very well gain access to the manifest functions of their own group 
behaviour, and thereby integrate the “manifest goals/unintended consequences” into their own 
intentional action27.  
The question “recognizable by whom?” is therefore of a more complex kind than 
assumed. In the case of the neo-Nazis, the group members may even make use of the “manifest 
function” of “integration” in order to defend their own group behaviour. In this case, the manifest 
function will turn into a recognized norm and value, at work in their intended group attitudes and 
behaviour. The “normativity” embedded in the concept of function should be apparent in this 
case. Further on, it is no reason to believe that the scientific analysis of the case (from the 
scientist’s point of view) will be completely neutral, either. A purely “observational” usage of the 
functionalist terminology will be difficult to accomplish: 
If the phenomenon of neo-Nazism is to be labelled as “functional” to the western cultures, 
the following arguments may be used: do the neo-Nazis not represent integrative forces, by being 
discriminatory against other cultures? Do they not praise the features of the traditional, national 
culture? On the contrary, it will not be hard to label their attitudes and actions as “dysfunctional”. 
Their actions will hardly be functional from the viewpoint of the protagonists of democracy and 
human rights, and certainly not from the viewpoint of the different minorities affected by the 
actions of the neo-Nazis. Their values, norms and actions are "dysfunctional" in the eyes of 
anyone who favours democratic and human rights. Democratic institutions and human rights do, 
after all, depend on a minimum equal rights, as well as mutual respect between individuals, in 
order to be operative. The neo-Nazi values will therefore be functional to protagonists of 
                                                 
27
 Such a response would amount to a “self-fulfilling prophecy”, cf. (Apel (1979): 264, 285 and 297), on “self-
fulfilling” versus “self-destroying prophecies”. 
 28
collective, traditional and authoritarian world-views, favouring collectively given values rather 
than individual rights. 
 
V Finishing Remarks. 
The case of neo-Nazism has proven to be a very useful example in this context. As a 
small-scale and “extreme case” example, the neo-Nazi group works as an exemplary device in 
clarifying the normative presuppositions made by the group itself, as well as the normative 
presuppositions made by the scientific community. The case-study has, hence, been serving the 
purpose of exemplifying the usage of hermeneutical and transcendental-pragmatic approaches 
within the field of social science.  
As pointed out in the previous parts of this paper, the scope of hermeneutics is not limited 
to small-scale cases.  Even higher-order theoretical perspectives with a descriptive intent might 
be hermeneutically examined in order to find their normative content, a content that might or 
might not be conforming to the meta-normative criterions of a transcendental-pragmatically 
transformed critical hermeneutics. Sigurd Skirbekk reads Durkheim in an exclusively anti-
individualist manner, by pointing at the integrative, supra-individual and authoritative forces of 
culture (S. Skirbekk (2000))28. Habermas's approach to Durkheim is, contrary to S. Skirbekk’s, 
compatible with the meta-normative conditions of symmetry, reciprocity and individual 
autonomy. As expected along with his discource-ethical concerns, Habermas criticizes the one-
sidedness of Durkheim’s collectivistic account of the “life-world”. On the one hand, Habermas 
considers the life-world to be a reproductive source of collective norms and values. On the other, 
he also regards it as the source of individual communicative competences. Habermas, hence, 
emphasizes the communicative potential of culture, regarding it as vital to the development of the 
communicative skills and autonomy of individuals (Habermas (1997): 139-41). His interpretation 
and criticism of Durkheim is therefore highly compatible with a “critical oriented hermeneutics”. 
Sigurd Skirbekk's account is certainly not, and would therefore be in need of a critical 
examination. The conservative reading of Durkheim seems to work well with the conservative 
concerns of the sociologist. These conservative concerns are made transparent in his diagnosis of 
the contemporary social world.  
The choice of examples in this paper has been advantageous, by including a higher-level 
theoretical approach to the phenomenon of racism (S. Skirbekk), as well as a lower-level 
theoretical model (Barker), and an empirical-oriented study (Fangen). Empirical studies are, after 
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all, not devoid of theoretical presuppositions. They may, more or less, depend on the viewpoints 
expressed by various “classic” works and/or lower-level models. A more comprehensive 
hermeneutical approach would take this linkage into consideration, by explicating the Weberian, 
Durkheimian, Parsonian or even Marxist “prejudices” inherent in an empirical study, as well as 
the prejudices made by the dominant models at use. This kind of hermeneutical explication can 
be conducted by the scientist herself/himself, by exploring the presuppositions made by her/his 
own study. “Meta-studies” may as well be carried out, in order to explicate the presuppositions 
made by others. Such an explication of normative presuppositions may very well be conducted in 
an impartial fashion, since hermeneutics does not inhabit any conditions for a critical approach. A 
switch to the transcendental-pragmatic presuppositions will therefore be needed, if a critical 
clarification is to be carried out.  
Transcendental pragmatics and hermeneutics will be compatible parts of a critical social 
science. Hermeneutics will serve as a device in explicating the normative preconditions 
embedded in theoretical and empirical perspectives. Transcendental pragmatics will employ the 
double function of working as conditions of validity as well as conditions of critique. Here, the 
meta-norms will be at work. Important to keep in mind in this respect, is the difference between 
meta-norms, norms and facts. Meta-norms are not confused with norms within transcendental 
pragmatics, nor are norms confused with facts. Transcendental pragmatics does, on the one hand, 
point to the differences between facts and norms. On the other hand, the interconnectedness 
between facts and norms is stressed.  
Descriptive approaches are, therefore, not impossible to carry out within the social 
sciences.  Descriptive approaches may, however, hide given normative presuppositions made by 
the scientists. Given that the social science aims at being critical, the various normative 
presuppositions must be taken into consideration. A strictly counterfactual premise will be at 
work here: if the social sciences aim at being critical, criterions of validity and critique will be 
needed. The social sciences may, after all, not inhabit such an aim at the real level. 
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 See S. Skirbekk’s usage of Durkheim, as well as his discussion of liberal values and human rights in: ”Culture at a 
Crossroad: Diversity in Culture - Unity in Rights?”, at http://www.uio.no/~sigurds 
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